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ContentsThe “American model”serves as a point of reference in discussions of eco-
nomic policy around the world. In countless op-ed pieces and sometimes
even in front-page articles, the American case is portrayed as a paradigm
of the free market in its purest form. Some say that U.S. performance rela-
tive to that of most countries in Western Europe during the 1990s
demonstrates the efficiency and dynamism of this model. Others agree,
but point to what they see as the unacceptable social costs of economic
success: deprivation at the bottom of the economic ladder and deep eco-
nomic insecurity on its middle rungs.
In this policy brief, James K. Galbraith offers a radically different perspec-
tive on the American success story of the 1990s. He argues that the real
sources of American economic strength have been misunderstood by ana-
lysts across the full range of the ideological spectrum.
Far from embracing a textbook model of untrammeled free enterprise,
the United States has relied heavily upon government intervention in
health care, pensions, and education. For example, though the ranks of
the uninsured grow every year, high-quality health care is available to
most of the population. When all of the various health insurance tax
breaks and programs for the poor, elderly, and disabled are accounted for,
the government pays nearly 60 percent of all health care costs, or 5.8 per-
cent of gross domestic product. Similarly, Social Security payments pro-
vide 60 percent of the elderly with their primary source of income. And
the vast system of public universities picks up much of the slack in labor
markets for the young.
Not only are these programs largely successful and popular with the
American public, but they also provide a Keynesian stimulus to spending
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Prefacethat, along with abundant credit, helps account for the strength of the
economy as a whole. Thus, the United States has succeeded in many
respects not by adhering strictly to free-market precepts, but by defying
them. European policymakers have learned the wrong lesson from the
American experience and have been tightening budget constraints rather
than loosening them.
Galbraith argues that while the American system has many problems of
its own, the European Union would benefit from some selective imitation
of the American style of big government. For example, a standardized
pension program for the entire European Union, patterned after Social
Security, would not only help alleviate the severe economic inequalities
among regions, but would also provide an infusion to the Continent’s
anemic economy. Now that the United States finds itself in a weak, jobless
recovery, the key to restoring growth here, too, may lie in the kinds of pro-
grams that Galbraith emphasizes, which could be shored up by, for exam-
ple,taking steps to ease the financial straits of state and local governments.
I am sure that Galbraith’s brief will provide fresh insights into the cliché-
ridden and often sterile debate over Europe’s economic problems. As
always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
June 2003
Public Policy Brief 6The American model fascinates Europeans. To many on the right, and
certainly to those in lofty perches in the official economic institutions
(such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
and the European Commission), the American version of the free market
as they imagine it represents an ideal type. It is the highest form of capi-
talism. It is to be celebrated for its efficiency and technological dynamism,
and even its capacity to deliver full employment—all free from the dead
hand of governmental regulation and control.1
These charms are largely lost on the European public. Certainly they are
lost on those who form the intellectual left. In their view, the American
model is repellent. Indeed, many perceive a fundamental clash between
modern Americanism and such “traditional European values” as fairness,
solidarity, and tolerance. This view emphasizes the rapacity of the
American multinational corporation, the absence of universal social serv-
ices in the United States, and the poverty and inequality delivered by
American labor markets. It is a position taken by many who seek to
defend European social democracy from further degradation.
There is also an emerging group of European progressives who regard the
arrival of the American way as a fact of nature, against which resistance is
futile. They are therefore attracted to American solutions to the problems
of the American model. In particular they emphasize the importance of
investments in education, of job training, and of new institutions for
“lifelong learning.”Such measures are particularly intended to help work-
ers adjust to the inevitable disruptiveness of life under unfettered capital-
ism. Such was the theme, for instance, of the Portuguese presidency of the
European Union a few years ago.
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Really About?All three groups—the European right, the left-leaning public, and 
the “third way” liberals—are concerned mainly with the evolution of
economic and social conditions in Europe. None of them are deeply
involved in the study of the United States for its own sake. In this way the
American model has become a stylized battleground for Europeans, a ter-
rain for struggle between those who would destroy European social
democracy, those who would defend it, and those who would adapt it as
best they can.
What the three groups share is a stabilized understanding of what the
American model is. This understanding is advanced by various forces
emanating from within the United States and is characterized by the 
principal tenets of the “Washington consensus”—the development strategy
for the whole world, as articulated by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund. These principles include deregulation; pri-
vatization; and the free setting of prices and, especially, wages, in compet-
itive markets, without interference from unions or concern for the shape
of the resulting distribution. The principles favor free international trade.
They favor reduction to the minimum of public subsidies, public transfer
payments including pensions, and public enterprise. And they favor the
application of “sound”fiscal and monetary policies, with the former ded-
icated to budget balance and the latter exclusively to price stability.
These principles suggest a relatively new image of the United States, an
image based entirely on views propagated since the early 1980s by right-
wing political spokesmen and certain academics. Such an image was
forcefully, even eloquently, articulated by President Ronald Reagan and
captured by his phrase “the magic of the marketplace.” It is a tribute to
the enduring power of Reagan’s rhetoric that such an image of the United
States continues to serve as a template for political and economic argu-
ments in Europe 20 years later.
But it is also an image with little foundation in the American reality. It is
useless as a guide to American economic performance. It is rooted in nei-
ther the historical nor the modern facts of American life. It is, in short, a
fantasy.
It is a dangerous fantasy for European progressives. By accepting it they
find themselves acknowledging the existence of an economy led to full
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What Is the American Model Really About?employment, at least for a time, through the application of free market
principles, including radical deregulation and the destruction of unions.
Progressives thus find themselves in the position of defending the dismal
economic performance of modern Europe—specifically, its high rate of
unemployment—on the ground that the alternative has unacceptable
social costs. In this way acquiescence in mass unemployment becomes the
price of defending civilization. The case for social democracy is fatally
weakened by the concession that it requires 10 percent of the population
to remain idle or to labor off the books in the gray economy.
Ordinary Europeans do not find this attractive. They prefer politicians
who promise jobs. This is what made it possible last year, until the winds
of war began to frighten people, for the conservative prime minister of
Bavaria to run a close campaign against the socialist federal chancellor of
Germany, based on a promise to reduce unemployment. The absurdity of
this position is self-evident when one examines the actual policies—
mainly anti-union measures dressed up as “labor market reform”—
offered by the Christian Democratic Union. But the position appeared
credible mainly because of its reference to the supposed facts of the
American model and their application to the Bavarian case.
It is equally ineffective for the European left to defend Europe by decrying
the social evils of the American model. The image routinely conjured for
this purpose—of an economy of wage slaves and debt peons dominated
by tycoons and maintained by racism, violence, and mass incarceration—
is plainly false, as any ordinary traveler to the United States can see. This
country has undoubted social problems, some of which are severe, but the
conventional framework that roots these problems in poverty and oppres-
sion doesn’t fit. Real wages in the United States are high. Some 70 percent
of American households own their own homes. More than a quarter of
the adult population has a college degree, and nearly half has had some col-
lege education. (No European country except the Netherlands approaches
these levels of education.) Even health care, on which Europeans pride
themselves, is abundantly available in the United States, where the urban
landscape is everywhere flecked with hospitals and clinics. Poverty among
the American elderly is low, and most seniors live independently, often in
the benign climates of Florida, California, or southern Texas. In southern
Europe, the elderly overwhelmingly live with their families, if they can.
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Soft Budgets and the Keynesian DevolutionMoreover, with unemployment low and jobs plentiful as recently as two
years ago, American real wages were rising, crime had declined, and most
working Americans were reasonably contented. This is a major part of the
reason why, in spite of a widely criticized campaign, Vice President Al
Gore was elected president of the United States in the year 2000, with a
plurality of over half a million votes and a larger total vote than any 
president-elect in history except Ronald Reagan himself in the boom and
landslide year of 1984. The fact that the election was later stolen from
Gore by the Florida political establishment and the Supreme Court can-
not gainsay this achievement.
By reacting to the United States through Reaganite perceptions, Europeans
deny themselves a correct understanding of the keys to the American
boom. This failure will prove an embarrassment to those on the right.
They will be obliged to change their account now that it is apparent that
the boom has ended. But the more serious problem is suffered by those
European progressives who, because of their misunderstanding of the
American model, cannot draw on the actual sources of recent American
success. Progressives therefore find themselves caught up in the advocacy
of “placebo” policies made popular in the United States itself, under the
general rubric of the “third way.” This advocacy may lead (and indeed in
recent years has led) to the election of center-left governments in Europe.
But it cannot lead to their subsequent economic or political success, for
the simple fact is that economic placebos, like medical ones, produce only
psychotherapeutic benefits.
The Real American Model: 
Soft Budgets in the Social Sectors
So what are the foundation stones of the “actually existing American
model”?
It is useful to approach this question by applying a concept familiar to
students of Central and Eastern Europe in the late years of communist
rule—that of the “soft budget constraint,” widely attributed to the
Hungarian economist Janos Kornai (1986). This concept described the
condition of state-owned heavy industry under the communist regimes 
as unable to make a profit or compete in international markets, yet so
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including the provision of social services, that it could not be allowed 
to fail. These industrial entities became widely deplored dependents of
the state budget and state banks, and in many cases collapsed along with 
the regimes of which they were a part. In retrospect, they are quietly (in
Russia, not so quietly) mourned by many. They provided millions with
the rudiments of a comfortable and secure life, which have not been
restored under the ensuing post-socialist orders.
The concept of the soft budget constraint is not normally applied to the
United States.A brief examination of key American institutions will estab-
lish, however, that the concept goes far toward explaining the structure
and conduct of our economy in the past 40 years, and particularly in the
prosperous period of the late 1990s. But it is in the particular character of
those institutions that the American economy can be distinguished from
the failed economies of the former communist world.
Which institutions? The keys to the American model lie in those sectors
providing social amenities to the middle class: health care, education,
housing, and pensions.
In the United States,health care consumes some 14 percent of gross domes-
tic product (GDP) (Levit et al. 2003).2 A typical expenditure in Europe is 8
to 10 percent of GDP; in the U.K. the outlay is 7.3 percent (OECD 2003a).
What few Europeans understand is that health expenditures within the
direct U.S. government budget consume 5.8 percent of GDP (OECD
2003a). While in France, for example, this proportion of total output sup-
plies medical services to the whole population, in the United States the
direct public commitment is only to the elderly, the disabled, poor families,
and veterans. For the rest of the covered population, medical care is paid
out of private insurance, which offers tax advantages. Over all, the tax-
financed share is just under 60 percent of total health expenditure,or nearly
8 percent of GDP (Woolhandler and Himmelstein 2002).
The scandals of American health care do not lie in its insufficiency (quite
the reverse!), but rather in two notorious facts. The first is that some 41
million people lack either public or private insurance. These include
many Latino immigrants, as well as younger working people. Hence, defi-
cient pre- and perinatal care is an important problem. The second fact
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Soft Budgets and the Keynesian Devolutionrelates to the rapacity of the private actors in the system—notably, drug
producers, doctors, nursing home operators, and insurance companies.
There is no doubt that some ideal system could provide a similar quantity
of effective medical care for much less money. Nevertheless, it is precisely
the presence of those actors and their political power that has made the
American health care system into the economic powerhouse it is.
Higher education in the United States consumes about 2.25 percent of
GDP. The figure for European countries is typically closer to 1 percent.
Again, the United States spends more on public higher education as a
share of GDP than do most European countries: 1.07 percent, compared
with 0.97 percent in Germany and 1.01 percent in France. In addition
there is the private share, another 1.22 percent of GDP, which involves
institutions whose multibillion-dollar endowments are bolstered by the
tax system (OECD 2003b). Fully public institutions, however, dominate
the scene in most of the country. For instance, over 80 percent of univer-
sity enrollments in my famously “free market” state of Texas are in state
institutions financed by land grants that at one time proved, fortuitously,
to be rich in oil (THECB 2003). Public and private institutions alike ben-
efit from federal research grants, contracts, and student loans.
The economic and socializing role of the American university system
receives too little attention among foreign observers, who tend to follow a
narrow quantitative framework in assessing the contribution of extra
years of schooling to the acquisition of “skills.” This is a nebulous con-
struct at best, and is only very loosely related to what American universi-
ties actually do. The true role of this sector can be much better understood
by examining its contribution to the demand side.
First, the U.S. population’s generally high level of education is reflected in
the society’s competence and cohesion. As noted earlier, nearly 26 percent
of the adult population has at least a four-year college degree, thanks in
part to the postwar GI Bill and the late-1950s McGovern Act (NCES
2003). This population is, essentially, ipso facto qualified to participate in
the economic life of an advanced credit economy. Having received educa-
tion loans, the population is eligible for mortgages and access to the entire
spectrum of private credit. It is presumed competent to navigate the tax
and subsidy system in order to take advantage of credits, deductions, and
guarantees. It is also presumed competent to consume advanced durable
Public Policy Brief 12
What Is the American Model Really About?goods, from private homes to automobiles to personal computers and
telecommunications devices.And,of course,it does so.
Second, higher education has a direct effect on employment and labor
force participation. It is not easy to obtain an accurate estimate of strictly
public spending on universities in the United States, in part because such
funding is a complex amalgam of federal, state, local, and private contri-
butions and also because ostensibly private universities benefit substantially
from public subsidies, from the huge incentive effect of the charitable
deduction and the estate tax, and from publicly funded student loans. But
the higher education sector in the United States is very large. It employs a
great many people, including, of course, large numbers of the intelli-
gentsia, who are thus kept contented and busy. Even more important, it
provides activities and diversions for many who would spend their
teenage years in the ranks of the jobless young if they were in Europe. The
psychological benefits of legitimated idleness and of the rituals of accom-
plishment provided by colleges and universities at this stage of life should
not be underestimated.
The United States maintains two additional public systems that keep oth-
erwise difficult-to-employ young people out of the ranks of the jobless.
One is the armed forces, which consume 4 percent of GDP and provide
competent mechanical training to their several million members, includ-
ing virtually the entire population of future commercial pilots, for exam-
ple (BEA 2003). The second is the prison system, whose much-expanded
role in recent years is deplorable, but whose economic function is not
altogether dissimilar in some respects to that of the military. (Still, it is
not the case, as some have alleged, that the prison population masked a
huge degree of “hidden unemployment” in the United States in the late
1990s. There was a labor shortage at the time, and many prisoners would
not have been jobless had they been free.) A major difference, of course, is
that these three institutions provide very different levels of access to credit
and other participatory mechanisms in later life.3
Consumption of housing services accounts for about 9 percent of U.S.
GDP, while residential construction accounts for another 4 percent (BEA
2003). The housing sector exists on its present scale thanks to a vast net-
work of supporting financial institutions, all subject to federal deposit
insurance, the secondary mortgage markets provided by quasi-public 
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Soft Budgets and the Keynesian Devolutioncorporations (Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, Freddie Mac), and the tax
deductibility of mortgage interest. In recent years such measures as the
Community Reinvestment Act have tended to oblige private financial
institutions to reduce their practice of redlining and thus extend credit to
poorer communities where their presence had previously been largely
predatory. As a result, interlocking patterns of economic development
have begun to occur, external diseconomies associated with urban
poverty have been reduced, and the prevalence of home ownership has
risen. This phenomenon has been called the “social construction of cred-
itworthiness” by the economist Gary Dymski of the University of
California at Riverside, an expert on credit flows in the economic kaleido-
scope of greater Los Angeles (Dymski 1998).
It is true that the housing finance system is the cause of major problems.
The crisis of the savings and loan institutions in the 1980s stemmed from
two sources: the effect of high interest rates on a sector whose income was
largely dependent on fixed-rate mortgages, and which therefore fell into
insolvency by the late 1970s, and the emergence of a powerful, politically
well-connected clique of criminals who championed and exploited dereg-
ulation in order to loot the corpses of these failing institutions. The
lawyer-economist-criminologist Bill Black has coined the term “control
fraud” to describe this pattern of behavior; he views the pattern of the
savings and loan debacle as the model for more recent disasters, such as
the collapse of Enron and WorldCom (Bernstein 2002). Nevertheless,
most Americans grow up in their own homes, and at present, home
equity remains the major collateral against which middle-class Americans
can borrow to support their consumption.
Finally, Social Security payments to the elderly and other income-security
programs finance about 8 percent of U.S. GDP, based on the reasonable
assumption that these transfers are substantially spent rather than saved by
their recipients. Some of these funds have already been counted as expendi-
tures for health care and housing, but arguably not that much. The
American elderly often live in paid-off homes and pay only a fraction of
their medical (as distinct from pharmaceutical) expenses out of pocket.
And Social Security funds a great deal of their ordinary daily consumption.
To be precise, Social Security alone is the major source of disposable
income for 60 percent of the American elderly; only 40 percent of the
Public Policy Brief 14
What Is the American Model Really About?elderly have substantial other sources of income, public or private (SSA
2003). The typical Social Security payment to an elderly couple in moder-
ate health approaches $20,000 per year, which, when combined with
Medicare, provides for a modest level of comfort in most of the country.4
Pockets of poverty remain among the elderly—single women with little
work credit can be in trouble—but it is important to emphasize that these
are pockets, not reservoirs. All in all, poverty among the American elderly
has fallen dramatically since the early 1970s and is now lower than among
the general population. This accomplishment is substantially the result of
expanded Social Security pensions.
Social Security has been under attack in recent years, and especially so
under the current Bush administration, for a straightforward reason.
Exactly as with the savings and loan debacle of the 1980s, sharp private
financial operators have seen the opportunities inherent in diverting the
cash flow of the public trust funds into private investment accounts. The
availability of such accounts would create, overnight, millions of inexperi-
enced investors who would be vulnerable to broker fraud and abuse. The
campaign to privatize Social Security reached a high-water mark in the
immediate wake of the stock market run-up of the late 1990s, when it was
possible to argue that the future elderly were making a bad investment
with Social Security payroll taxes. This argument has since lost its force,
owing to the stock market collapse and the general disrepute into which
brokers such as Merrill Lynch have rightly fallen. Mr. Bush’s Social
Security “Reform” Commission disappeared without a trace. The push 
for private investment accounts has since gone underground—the
Republican campaign committee even purged “privatization”from the lex-
icon of its candidates in the 2002 election. It will resurface only if the for-
tunes of the Republican Party are revived by war and terrorism.Otherwise,
Social Security will remain a public system in the United States.
Add these elements together (subtracting a bit for the double-counting
mentioned earlier) and they account for nearly 40 percent of the total
consumption of goods and services in the United States. Moreover, the
direct contribution of nonmilitary public expenditure at the federal, state,
and local levels, which amounts to another 14 percent of GDP (BEA
2003), has not been included. Of this, a bit more than 2 percent repre-
sents activity directly undertaken by the federal government; the rest is
expenditures by state and local governments, of which a high percentage
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Soft Budgets and the Keynesian Devolutiongoes for public education. More than 88 percent of American school-
children attend public schools, a proportion that has not fallen in recent
years (NCES 2003). Efforts to undermine public education in the United
States—for instance, by privatizing public school systems or providing
vouchers to permit children attending weak schools to relocate—so far
represent only a tiny fraction of total public education expenditures. They
receive a great deal of media attention, but they have never enjoyed wide-
spread popular support—even in Texas.
All in all, the public sector underpins in one way or another activity in
well over half of the American economy, and in so doing helps to sustain
and stabilize the growth of the economy as a whole. The margins of
American politics involve battles over the boundaries between public and
private control. Deregulation of transportation, telecommunications, and
energy markets in recent years, reduction in public housing and welfare,
and the so-far unsuccessful assaults on public education and Social
Security represent advances and victories for private interest. Expansion
of the Earned Income Tax Credit after 1993 and a large increase in the
number of Social Security disability recipients in recent years represent
movements in the other direction; together, they outweigh cutbacks in the
traditional welfare program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(which has been converted into a block grant to states and is called
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), though their benefits do not
invariably go to the same recipients.
The point to emphasize is not that the United States is full of hospitals,
universities, housing, and pensioners. So, too, obviously, is Europe. It is
rather that in the United States these sectors are funded by a bewildering
variety of financial schemes involving public support in myriad direct
and indirect ways, including direct appropriations, loans, guarantees, and
tax favors. Some of these are on budget and some are off budget, some are
discretionary and some are nondiscretionary, but there exists a broad
political constituency behind all of them, which gives them political stay-
ing power. And control over the scale of these activities has slipped away
from those who ostensibly oversee the public budget.
And this is the genius, if one may call it that, of the American model. The
soft budget constraint (which as recently as the 1960s was entirely the
province of the military) has come to apply precisely where it can do the
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provide universally demanded human services to the population. In other
words, powerful political constituencies exist to keep these sectors at the
forefront of American life, and it is very likely that they will remain there.
One gets the impression that this is not the case in Europe, where health
care and higher education remain substantially public sector activities, as
do housing and pensions (outside the post-Thatcher U.K.), compared to
those elements in the United States. This accounts, in part, for the higher
share of European GDP measured as passing through the government sec-
tor. But it also helps to account for the difficulties Europe experiences in
absorbing its employable population. Public sectors are subject to hard
budget constraints, in part because the public sector cannot lobby nearly so
effectively as the private sector for public support. And where the public
sector is given a near monopoly in the provision of a service (such as health
care), the private sector is forced to operate in other areas—protected 
private retail shops and small farms,for instance—that may not enjoy com-
parable rates of growth as incomes rise. The American system of dual
mechanisms of finance is far less efficient, but it absorbs many more indi-
viduals into gainful employment. Moreover, as European national budgets
come into conformity with criteria established by the European Union,
expansion of human services becomes more difficult,rather than less so.
The Unimportance of Labor Market Adjustment
In all of this, then—in the great rise of the United States toward full
employment, followed by the subsidence of the past two years—what has
been the role of the vaunted flexibility of American labor markets?
Europeans are accustomed, of course, to being told that such flexibility
was the essential ingredient in the rise of the New Economy in the United
States, beginning with the brave new era of free markets under Reagan.
But in fact, increasing labor market flexibility is not the cause of falling
American unemployment. When American labor markets became more
unequal in the 1980s, unemployment was stubbornly high. American
labor markets did not become more flexible as the economy approached
full employment in the late 1990s.And they have certainly not become less
flexible in the present recession.
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biguously, that structures of pay became substantially more equal as the
1990s progressed and unemployment declined.5 The United States did
not approach full employment by increasing pay inequality; on the con-
trary, that form of inequality declined. This fact was deeply obscured in
most people’s perception by the rise in household income inequality—a
very different matter, attributable in part to changing family structures
and in part to the boom in the stock market and capital gains income.
The American bubble concentrated wealth in the hands of a small num-
ber of technology tycoons, but the resulting boom in investment demand
and employment actually reduced inequalities in pay and wages.
Moreover, the late 1990s also demonstrated the trivial role played in the
employment picture by such measures as job retraining and lifelong edu-
cation programs. Such policies had been in place since the early 1980s,
when the Job Training Partnership Act supplanted public employment,
but without noticeable effect (See Lafer 2002). It was only when labor
demand rose to full-employment levels that unemployment disappeared.
And then, of course, by far the largest fraction of new jobs went to people
who had never taken part in any training program.
In earlier work I have argued that the much-repeated comparison of an
inegalitarian, full-employment United States with an underemployed,
egalitarian Europe was and is based,in part,on an optical illusion resulting
from a misperception of the appropriate boundaries. It is true that U.S.
society is substantially more unequal than the societies of northern
European countries,and roughly as unequal,by most measures,as those of
southern European countries. But these regional comparisons ignore the
component of inequality contributed by differences in average pay among
European countries. These differences remain far more substantial than
comparable differences among American states, which are, of course,
already taken into account in measures of American inequality (Galbraith,
Conceicao,and Ferreira 1999).
When between-country differences across Europe are taken into account
for industrial pay, using the OECD’s Structural Analysis data set, we find
pay inequalities to be higher for Europe as a whole than for the United
States. Thus we conclude that unemployment and inequality are not 
substitutes, but complements, when measured at the appropriate level of
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Europe—higher in the poorer and more unequal countries—emerges as
simply a reflection, not of inflexible labor markets in poor countries, but
rather of the fact that Europeans, when unemployed, prefer to be unem-
ployed at home. This phenomenon can be remedied only by providing
jobs. This can be done either in situ—clearly the better option—or in
richer countries to which Europe’s poor will eventually migrate if nothing
is done for them where they live.
The Myth and the Reality of the New Economy
The rise to full employment in the United States in the late 1990s
occurred, in major part, because of a very steady expansion of the quasi-
public sectors, in spite of the fact that the federal government sector did
not grow at all. State and local governments did, in fact, expand rapidly as
the boom gathered force. So did tax-subsidized expenditures on housing
and health care. However, the more or less predominantly private sector—
specifically, the high technology component—also played a role, which is
worth examining at this point.
What was the role of the information technology boom that so filled 
the news emanating from the United States at the end of the last millen-
nium? The answer can be gleaned from the national income and product
accounts, which show that from 1997 to the peak in 2000, business non-
residential fixed investment rose by about $300 billion 1996 dollars, a
gain of about 2 percent (from 12.3 to 14.4 percent) in relation to GDP.
Most of the gain would have been in technology investment. A subse-
quent falloff, on the order of $150 billion, has brought total business
fixed investment to a level below that of health care expenditures. The
entire falloff in business investment to date may be replaced by the
increase in the military budget that has been requested by the Bush
administration.
In terms of employment, generous estimates in 2000 held that 8 percent of
the American labor force worked in the high-technology sector. This esti-
mate (generated by the Clinton administration’s Commerce Department)6
was almost surely overstated, as it included, for example, total employ-
ment in the media and entertainment sectors. An estimate of 2 to 3 
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perhaps half that would be a reasonable estimate today.
It remains true, of course, that the bubble in the information sectors con-
tributed the final ingredient to the concoction that produced the great
American boom of the late 1990s, driving unemployment below 4 percent
for a sustained and happy period, while numerous young and supposedly
glamorous business figures grew extravagantly rich. But the overall role of
this sector in that achievement has been as grotesquely overstated as were
its stock valuations. (As the economist Robert Barbera [2001] remarked,
Cisco was never actually larger than France.) Complicit in the exaggera-
tion were the media, stock analysts, brokerage firms, and high govern-
ment officials, notably President Clinton on one side (who courted high
technology relentlessly for its glamour and campaign funds) and Alan
Greenspan on the other (who succumbed to the seduction of a “new par-
adigm” view that would excuse the Federal Reserve for having tolerated
high unemployment for decades beforehand). Greenspan knew that there
was a bubble, knew that he had the tools to control it, and failed to take
the actions that prudence dictated.
The Keynesian Devolution
But the bubble happened, and all the forces mentioned above combined to
generate full employment in the late 1990s for the conventional Keynesian
reason: a high level of effective demand. The peculiarity of effective
demand in the United States, which seems to have eluded European
observers, was that although much of it was generated or encouraged by
acts of public policy, most of it did not register on the public balance sheet.
Thus the United States achieved full employment not only with formally
balanced public budgets, but with recorded surpluses. One might call this
the Keynesian Devolution. Left unstated are the implicit financial liabilities
of the public sector with regard to businesses and households. These were
the powerful new Keynesian mechanisms of the new economy in the
United States, just as essential as recorded budget deficits were to Keynesian
policy in the days before credit markets had reached their present scale.
The problem of the Keynesian Devolution lay not in its efficacy as a
mechanism for growth and prosperity, but in the unsustainability of its
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Institute has emphasized in a series of papers (Papadimitriou et al. 2002;
Godley 2003), the American household sector’s spending has relentlessly
exceeded its income since 1997. Ratios of debt to income have risen well
above historic highs. The net negative acquisition of financial assets
peaked at around 3 percent of GDP in 2001 and has since been falling
sharply, in a process known as reversion. For the moment, a continued
willingness to borrow against the value of housing has propped up the
American consumer—a very risky prospect for homeownership in the
long run. When this borrowing ends, as households cut back on spend-
ing in order to bring their outlays into line with their (declining)
incomes, a prolonged period of stagnation, if not recession, will be
unavoidable.
A reversion toward historical norms in saving and spending behavior was
already under way in the United States before the traumatic events of
September 11, 2001. At the moment that crisis hit, an almost universal
view held that it would drive the economy into recession. In fact, as revi-
sions of the economic statistics later demonstrated, the economy had
already been in recession for three quarters, and in the aftermath of
September 11 came policy changes that produced a rapid return to eco-
nomic growth by the end of the year. These included tax cuts (already
enacted but not yet in effect) that provided a cash rebate to most taxpay-
ers, spending increases for war and relief for victims of the attacks, rapid
cuts in the interest rate, a reduction in world oil prices, and a massive
inventory liquidation by automobile manufacturers. Together, these
helped lift the economy in the fourth quarter of 2001 and in 2002, pro-
viding the professional chorus of optimists in the financial profession
with evidence that full-employment prosperity would soon return.
A Crisis in the American Model? 
Unfortunately, all these direct Keynesian measures were temporary. The tax
rebates have been exhausted; the government’s relief spending is finished.
Interest rates are already close to zero, leaving little room for further cuts.
Oil prices have returned to pre–September 11 levels. The automobile
companies continued to provide bargains to consumers through the end
of 2002 while maintaining output and employment, but they appear now
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Iraq—injected additional uncertainty into the business climate.
Furthermore, the new fiscal era dawned badly for the state and local gov-
ernment sector, which continues to operate under quasi-hard budget con-
straints imposed by constitutional balanced-budget requirements (Lav
and Johnson 2002). State and local spending grew rapidly in the good
times of the late 1990s, and states and localities generally maintained their
spending levels in the first two years of the new millennium, through the
depletion of financial reserves. But that moment is largely past. States that
relied heavily on capital gains taxes and income taxes on stock option
realizations are in very bad shape at the moment. For fiscal year 2004,
California faces a budget gap of $18 billion to $26 billion, while the com-
bined budget shortfall for all states is in the range of $70 billion to $85
billion. Local governments confront similar crises (Lav and Johnson
2002). If states and localities cannot avoid cutting their spending or rais-
ing taxes, they could deplete as much as 1 percent from the overall spend-
ing stream in the year ahead.
Thus the American Model is entering a moment, even a prolonged phase,
of crisis. This crisis is mainly due to the behavior of sectors where budget
constraints continue to bite—or where they are starting to bite again after
many years. These include business investment, which is affected by the
virtual disappearance of retained profits. The state and local government
sector, constitutionally required to balance its budgets, is entering a phase
of deep fiscal crisis that could gravely undermine the popular public pro-
grams that are currently administered at the state level. Looming over all
of this is the household sector, which may fall victim to a combination of
its own financial prudence and the closing of lending windows. To the
extent that the state fiscal crisis affects education and health care and the
household sector backs away from new mortgage borrowing, soft budget
constraints may be giving way to hard constraints. Unless reversed, such a
trend could derail the continued success of the American Model.
What, Then, for Europe?
A comprehensive approach to European unemployment must produce a
consistently higher rate of economic growth, aimed at absorbing 30 to 35
Public Policy Brief 22
What Is the American Model Really About?million Europeans into gainful employment, particularly in lower-income
regions where unemployment and underemployment are pandemic.
How is this to be achieved? Part of the answer must lie in the orientation
of macroeconomic policy. American monetary and fiscal policy remains
governed (nominally, at least) by the 1978 Full Employment Act, and the
political economy of the United States does not tolerate the sole focus on
inflation that is the obsession and constitutional mandate of the European
Central Bank. To achieve higher economic growth, the objective of full
employment must be not simply part of the European Charter, but a core
objective of all policymaking institutions. This includes the fiscal authori-
ties and the central bank. It must be more important in practice than
either price stability or fiscal balance, and the authorities must recognize
that fiscal balance is a consequence,not a cause,of full employment.
Expanded credit access, through loan guarantees, home-buyer subsidies,
and secondary mortgage markets, can help distribute the burden of
increasing effective demand over the private sector. It seems likely that
some part of the sharp drop in unemployment in Spain following cur-
rency unification—from 20 percent to around 10 percent—has resulted
from the reduction in credit risk associated with the transition from a
devaluation-prone peseta to the euro. This step alleviated the bias favor-
ing tradeable goods in the composition of Spanish output and facilitated
the financing of enterprises in the services sector.
It should also be recognized, however, that this aspect of the “American
solution”—particularly unsecured consumer credit—is unstable.Europeans
would be unwise to encourage a buildup of private-sector debt on the
American scale or excessive reliance on this single instrument.
It is better to raise incomes. Unlike the United States, Europe lacks
retirement systems on the continental as opposed to the national scale;
consequently, the purchasing power of the elderly and other economi-
cally secondary populations (including nonemployed women) in the
less wealthy countries is weak. In particular, elderly residents of poorer
European countries remain poor by European standards. This is mani-
festly unjust, and it is also uneconomic. The remedy is to move toward 
a Europeanized pension system that would pay all European elderly on
the basis of continentwide average productivity. Why, in an integrated
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a pension set by past average productivity in Portugal alone? His or her
home might be next to that of a German or Dutch retiree whose pension
payments, after a lifetime of equivalent or easier labor, amount to much
more. The EU should begin the task of leveling pensions. Similarly, it
could also implement a system to increase the income of the lowest-paid
members of the European Union workforce, analogous to the U.S. Earned
Income Tax Credit.
There are also large areas of public or quasi-public social commitment in
the United States that are comparatively underfunded in Europe. Europe
funds certain sectors very well—public transportation, for instance—at
least by U.S. standards. But an examination of European employment
patterns compared with those in the United States reveals the key compo-
sitional or structural issue: a deep deficiency of services employment in
Europe, evident in nearly every major sector. Europe does not lack com-
petitive factory jobs so much as it lacks the effective means to employ
people in mundane services activities in the nontraded goods sectors.
In higher education, one step toward a solution seems clear to a transat-
lantic observer. Why can’t Europe begin to emulate the American univer-
sity system? There are virtually no pan-European universities; the
creation of even a handful of major EU-funded institutions, strategically
located in Greece, Portugal, southern Italy, and Spain—as well as in the
former East Germany, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland—could
have significant effects on regional development patterns and, ultimately,
on continental integration. The competition from these pan-European
institutions would force an upgrading of existing national universities,
which are underfunded by American standards. Clearly, this measure (not
training programs) is the key to what Europeans like to call the “knowl-
edge base.” The key to a successful university system is money—obtained
not only through public grants, but through private charitable donations
that are strongly supported by the tax system. A European wealth tax
with targeted charitable deduction provisions for universities—perhaps
favoring transnational institutions—might do wonders for higher educa-
tion in Europe.
Europeans have long had a superior mechanism for ensuring access to
health care, and perhaps also for managing the delivery of services. But, as
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improvements in European health facilities could be funded by the EU,
with special emphasis on lower-income regions. Perhaps equally impor-
tant would be an expansion in facilities for the care of the infirm elderly,
whether in the form of institutions or by simply employing trained pro-
fessionals to assume part of the burden of caring for the elderly in their
own homes.
In sum, Europe needs public investment, private credit, and direct trans-
fers to lower-income populations, both working and nonworking.
Europe needs, in short, softer budgets in strategic sectors in order to
transform the mechanisms of the welfare state, which were pioneered 
in the postwar period, from a national to a continental scale. This is the
antithesis of the current conservative prescription. But the American
experience stands as evidence that it is a prescription that works. As we
have learned, these measures are not, in the economic sense, transfers
from the rich to the poor. They are, rather, the use of appropriate means
to mobilize otherwise unemployed resources in poor and otherwise fis-
cally incapable regions.
It would be nice to imagine that Europe might move smoothly back to
full employment under the influence of purely European models. But so
long as European policymakers remain fixated on labor markets and
sound finance, these models will not work. Meanwhile, the American
model as it really exists, notwithstanding its current troubles, is also
worth European investigation. It is clear enough to most Americans that
the only way out of our current troubles is through expansion of the pub-
lic and quasi-public instrumentalities we already have—for instance,
through a revival of federal revenue sharing to support state and local
spending and an increase in the federal role in support of the state-
administered Medicaid program. This would constitute a further
Keynesian Devolution; these and similar proposals will certainly form
the core agenda of the American political opposition in the years imme-
diately ahead.
The path to European full employment also may lie partly through such
mechanisms.A good place to start might well be with the basics, such as a
continental Social Security system, pioneered as it was in the American
New Deal.
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1. The author thanks Travis Hale for checking facts.
2. When the figure was only 13 percent, Paul A. Samuelson remarked to
me in private conversation,“It’s the best 13 percent of GDP.”
3. The various public veterans programs and preferences can best be
thought of as a means of compensating military personnel for the
disadvantages they would otherwise suffer relative to university grad-
uates. No one, of course, thinks similar compensation is warranted
for ex-convicts.
4. Not, of course, in New York City—but then, many elderly New
Yorkers go to Florida, which is not too bad.
5. For details on this issue, see Galbraith (1998) or, for updated meas-
ures, refer to the University of Texas Inequality Project website at
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu.
6. The actual study of this topic has proved ephemeral, probably for
good reason.
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